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Abstract: 
Reforming Mexico’s Labor Law for Independent Labor Unions analyzes the legal 
difficulties Mexican independent labor unions face in establishing themselves and 
proposes a legislative solution. The methodology used examines the institutionalized 
behaviors of the administrative labor boards and businesses, which prevent the formation 
of independent labor unions. The discretion that Mexican labor law affords the labor 
boards and businesses explains, in large measure, the obstacles facing independent labor 
unions. Having analyzed the relevant legal framework this article proposes specific 
legislation to strengthen these independent labor unions. Within the context of a 
developing country, Reforming Mexico’s Labor Law for Independent Labor Unions 
shows the powerful impact that the law can have on a social problem. 
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2Part I: Introduction. 
 “Shortly after Vicente Fox was elected president of Mexico, some investigative 
reporters went to the Fox family farms and found underage children working in the field 
in violation of Mexico’s Constitution and Federal Labor Law” (Ley Federal del Trabajo: 
LFT).1 As this disconcerting example illustrates, Mexico has labor laws, but they do not 
have the authorities' backing. In fact, Mexican law guarantees some of the most extensive 
of worker’s rights in the world. Yet, for all this legal fanfare, Mexican workers do not 
receive the benefits the law promises them. Given the legal guarantees on the books, why 
has Mexican labor suffered so?   
1. Problem and Proposed Solution. 
Bad labor conditions prevail in Mexico in part because the state's labor boards 
(Juntas de Conciliación y Arbitraje) prevent the development of non-official labor unions 
independent of the state and business. Transformative change to support independent 
unions and thereby improve labor conditions calls for a bill reforming the LFT as it 
governs the labor boards.  
2. Context. 
 We begin by briefly touching upon globalization to situate the bad labor 
conditions as part of this larger challenge. Although the remainder of the research report 
focuses on the labor boards' specific problems, our bill must constitute part of a broader 
legislative program, which would assist Mexico in overcoming the challenges 
globalization poses to workers. We also describe in some detail the prevailing labor 
conditions, which demand our attention and concern. Although we recognize freedom of 
3association as a right, the fact that independent labor unions concretely improve labor 
conditions motivates our bill. In this regard, we present evidence of the critical role that 
independent labor unions can play in securing adequate labor conditions. In essence, this 
latter part substantiates our view that by supporting independent labor unions, our bill 
will, in effect, lead to better labor conditions. 
a) Globalization. 
Globalization and neoliberal economic policies provides the backdrop explanation 
for labor’s crisis. Global competition has taken its toll on Mexican workers. Between 
1992 and 1996, with the introduction of neoliberal economic reforms, the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1994 Peso Crisis, workers' wages 
dramatically fell by nearly 40%.2 While capital has secured for itself transnational 
mobility, as well as, formidable international protections, states have continued to impose 
severe restrictions on labor’s freedom of movement (i.e., immigration laws) and have 
succeeded in sidelining labor protections in comparison to those for capital. One has 
merely to contrast the headlines heralding the World Trade Organization, which goal is to 
lower barriers to trade and investment, with the relative obscurity of the International 
Labor Organization, which dedicates itself to invigorating workers’ rights. This power 
imbalance between labor and capital makes for a race to the bottom as nations compete 
against one another to lower labor costs to attract investment. The result is that while 
capital may thrive, workers generally do not benefit, but instead suffer the vagaries of 
politics and policies at the behest of capital. Nonetheless, while it behooves us to advance 
labor rights on an international level, taking steps to ensure them through reforming 
national legislation is a necessary first step in the right direction. 
4b) Labor Conditions. 
The working conditions in Mexico are severe with long and arduous work hours.  
In manufacturing labor worked 47 hours a week on average with nearly 80% working 
over 40 hours a week and 25% working over 48 hours. Furthermore, while productivity 
has increased significantly since the introduction of NAFTA (an astonishing 40%), this 
has not translated into higher wages. Standard economics would have us predict that 
wages would increase in tandem with an increase in productivity because it claims that 
companies pay their workers in function of their value, i.e., their productivity. Reality 
contradicts the prediction linking increased productivity to higher labor remuneration. 
The 1995 peso devaluation, an exogenous factor it is true, wrought a 32% decline in 
wages in the economy overall. Even as of 2002 wages remained 8% lower than prior to 
NAFTA and the peso crisis despite the tremendous gains in productivity. Workers have 
fared no better in terms of fringe benefits. 42% of workers received nothing in this 
regard: neither health insurance nor pensions from their employers. True, the state 
provides some measure of assistance in this area, but insufficiently.3
While NAFTA has not brought the benefits promised to Mexican workers, its 
side-agreement on labor (the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation: 
NAALC) has shined a spotlight on the widespread opprobrious working conditions, most 
notably, in the maquiladoras. These enterprises (predominantly owned by international 
corporations) manufacture goods for the U.S. economy across the border, i.e., export-
processing firms in Export Processing Zones (EPZs). Under the agreement, private actors 
can bring claims against the violators of labor standards to the National Administrative 
Organizations set up in the member states (Mexico, U.S., and Canada). Even though 
5states respond minimally to the NAO’s directives, the claims nonetheless serve to 
illuminate the state of Mexican labor conditions. Over half the 23 cases filed targeted 
firms located in Mexico.4
The U.S. NAO report on the Tijuana Han Young maquiladora case in Mexico 
exemplifies the unacceptable labor conditions prevalent in Mexico. Throughout 1997, the 
Secretary of Labor and Social Forecasting (Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social: 
Secretary of Labor), found 41 health and safety violations contravening its national labor 
standards. These included the lack of a plant health and safety committee, of health and 
safety plans, of employee training, of hazard controls, concerning noise, fume and fire 
hazards, of procedures to prevent electrocutions and amputations, and the reliance upon 
life-threatening machinery in a state of disrepair. A year later, subsequent to multiple 
inspections, the Secretary revealed 36 violations remained uncorrected, along with 9 
additional violations. Han Young’s predicament was “resolved” only when the 
corporation closed the plant and relocated to another location in the same city of Tijuana. 
Meanwhile, they fired those workers involved in the strikes, which had called attention to 
the firm’s violations.5
c) Impact of Independent Unions. 
We briefly turn to the question of whether or not independent unions would 
improve labor conditions assuming our bill would succeed in spurring their growth. A 
recent paper undertook just such a study. We first note that in the formal sector union 
membership declined from 30% to under 20% from 1984 to 2000. Without unions wages 
21% lower in 1984 and 15% lower in 1996 would have prevailed. In the nonwage sector, 
workers would have received 40% less in 1984 and 35% less in wages in 1996. In terms 
6of fringe benefits, unions obtained a 142% increase in 1992 while only a 26% increase in 
1999. Productivity appears to rise 25% among union establishments as compared to 
nonunionized firms in 1992 and 12% in 1999. Firms’ profits do not seem adversely 
affected by union membership. Not only do unions appear to provide substantial benefits 
to union and nonunion workers alike while not detracting from the business’ bottom line, 
but the decrease in union membership and thereby workers' bargaining power correlates 
with a decrease in the benefits redounding to workers.6 While the results come from only 
one study, this study applied the same analytical framework and obtained similar results 
as did a well-regarded study conducted in the United States.7 Seen in this light, unions 
vigorously defending their workers’ rights can play a critical role in securing better labor 
conditions and justifying our bill's aims to encourage these independent and 
representative unions. 
We have seen that any bill addressing labor conditions must ultimately comprise 
part of a larger legislative program to confront globalization's challenges. The deplorable 
labor conditions in Mexico demand remedial action. In light of the logic and evidence 
indicating that representative unions improve labor conditions our bill seeks to address 
this urgent need by removing the obstacles to such labor unions 
3. Outline. 
The rest of this legislative research report aims to harness reason informed by 
experience to change the institutions (relations of repetitive behaviors) that prevent the 
organization of independent unions. In "Part II: The Difficulty the Bill Will Address," we 
first survey the nature and scope of the problem, i.e., independent unions’ difficulty in 
asserting themselves. This part introduces the surface appearance of the problem our bill 
7aims to resolve, that is to say, the lack of independent unions. We then describe the 
primary role occupants’ behaviors, which bear responsibility for the independent unions' 
anemic defense of workers’ interests: the alliance between the state's labor boards and 
business. Here we introduce the key players and some of their organizations to identify 
who influences the labor boards and to what extent. We also present the problematic 
behaviors that the labor boards abet as the LFT's enforcer skewed to favor neoliberal 
interests. In effect, as an adjudicatory body the labor boards' condemnable role is to 
sanction neoliberal behavior through its interpreting and applying the LFT. In other 
words, we describe the labor boards' inputs and outputs. We follow with a social impact 
statement assessing how the present situation benefits or hurt the various role occupants. 
We then conclude this heading. 
In "Part III: Explanation of the Causes of the Behaviors that Comprise the 
Difficulty," we explain the role occupants' behaviors in question with the help of the 
ROCCIPI methodology. The ROCCIPI methodology serves as a comprehensive program 
of analysis comprising Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process, 
Interests, and Ideology. We canvass first and foremost the relevant LFT rules governing 
the activities in which the role occupants play the principal role. We then analyze the 
modalities of these role occupants' behaviors with the aid of the remaining OCCIPI 
agenda. For, while the rules, more or less, circumscribe the range of behaviors, the other 
OCCIPI modalities determine behavior within the boundaries the rules establish. 
In "Part IV: Proposal for a Solution," we examine various alternative proposals, 
which have the potential to address the deplorable labor conditions in Mexico generally 
and pay special attention to options that purport to foster independent labor unions to this 
8end of improving labor conditions. We then explain our proposed bill's major reform 
provisions, which support the formation of representative unions. Further, we ascertain 
precisely how the bill will help to strengthen independent unions and by extension to 
dismantle anti-union state-business alliance. We proceed by linking the mechanisms by 
which the bill addresses the causes underlying the specific problematic behaviors. We 
also analyze the costs and benefits of the bill to assess its likely consequences. Finally, 
we underline the monitoring measures. These measures provide us with the critical 
feedback on the bill's effectiveness, which only time and its actual implementation can 
reveal. We then conclude.  
Part II: The Difficulty the Bill Will Address. 
1. Introduction. 
 Examining the problem serves as the indispensable starting point for the research 
report by providing data on the problem the bill seeks to address. To this effect, we begin 
by conducting an overview of the challenges independent unions face. We follow by 
describing the primary role occupants’ behavior: That of the labor boards and business. 
We then offer a short social impact statement describing the costs and benefits of the 
present situation and how they redound to each of the role occupants. We then conclude. 
2. Nature and Scope of the Difficulty. 
Mexican unions often do not represent their workers. The Confederation of 
Mexican Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos: CTM) and the Labor 
Congress (Congreso del Trabajo) represent the two main umbrella organizations for these 
9so-called non-representative officialist unions. They negotiated 81,4% of all collective 
contracts.8 Workers' widespread discontent with their unions highlights the nature and 
scope of the problem. A survey of workers in the Exclusive Union of Mexican Electrical 
Workers (Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicano: 
SUTERM), a powerful union in Mexico, revealed a strong degree of dissatisfaction with 
the union’s internal organization.  
“Do you consider that the union leadership is representative of the interests of 
workers?” 
47.5%
“Do you think that the leadership has been effective in negotiating positive 
conditions for workers in terms of wages and benefits?” 
35% 
“Would you consider the role of union delegates at the section or department 
level to be satisfactory?” 
17.5%
“Do union assemblies take place timely following the provisions stipulated in 
the union statutes?” 
15% 
“Do you consider that the processes for the selection leaders are clean and 
transparent?” 
70% 
* percentage answering yes from a sampling of 40 SUTERM members (1999-2001).9
While the paucity of such surveys makes their results anecdotal, a study of the 
Mexican automobile maquiladora industry tends to corroborate unions' 
unrepresentativeness. Unions that genuinely represent their worker strive to achieve 
control in the following areas: Promotion procedures and employment security (including 
union participation in hiring and promotions, and limitations on temporary workers), the 
production process (union participation in determining the production rate, work 
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assignments, wage equalization, and occupational health and safety measures), and 
specification of conflict resolution procedures. Out of 14 auto plants the study found that 
only those three plants with independent unions unaffiliated with CTM had positive 
control in these areas of union concern, revealing a dearth in genuinely representative 
unions.10 
The experiences of three textile maquiladoras provides concrete evidence of the 
difficulty of establishing representative unions. In the Han Young case previously 
mentioned two years elapsed during which NGOs, both domestic and internationally, as 
well as, US government diplomacy pressured the Mexican government to intercede in 
favor of the workers. Indeed, the NAO issued a report condemning the Mexican 
government’s interposing itself against the workers exercising their right of association. 
The case ended only when Han Young fired everyone and relocated. Prior to the cases’ 
sad denouement, thugs pounced upon and severely beat the leader of the independent 
union effort precisely during a government sponsored meeting in response to the Han 
Young incident laying bear the impunity of labor rights’ violators.11 Workers’ 
experiences to form an independent union at the Kundong and Duro maquiladora plants 
in Puebla and Rio Bravo met with the same resistance. Workers at these plants succeeded 
in establishing a representative union, although their efforts met with success only after 9 
months and three years, respectively.12 Government intercession on the workers’ behalf 
only took place in the face of significant international NGO pressure, which emphasizes 
the tremendous difficulties workers face in establishing independent unions.  
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3. Whose and What Behaviors Constitute the Difficulty. 
a) Labor Boards. 
 The state commands the heights of the economy. Congress passes legislation, but 
the executive Presidency appoints those in charge of implementing legislative directives. 
The President appoints the Secretary of Finance who oversees general economic policy. 
The President also appoints the Secretary of Labor and Social Forecasting (Secretaria del 
Trabajo y Previsión Social: Secretary of Labor), who oversees the labor boards. Mexico 
lacks a professional civil service corps. Prior to the Debt Crisis, executive officials came 
instead predominantly from the ranks of politicians who had climbed the PRI echelons. In 
the 1980s so-called technocrats began to displace the career politicians. These technocrats 
with business or economic backgrounds often originated as powerful businessmen.  The 
pro-business PAN’s electoral success epitomizes this change and Fox has all the bearings 
of a technocrat. He studied at Universidad Iberoamericana and at Harvard’s Business 
School and formerly supervised Coca-Cola’s Latin American operations. Similarly, the 
present Secretary of Labor, Carlos Abascal, a lawyer specialized in business 
administration, left behind a CEO position for an insurance company, and the former 
president of the powerful business association, the Mexican Employers' Confederation 
(Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicina: COPARMEX). When Duro’s 
independent union petitioned to hold a union election on neutral ground he denied the 
request. Abascal himself has the primary responsibility for the labor boards and labor 
justice. 
We now return to the incontrovertible evidence that the boards disfavor 
independent unions. In essence, they discriminate against independent unions in favor of 
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officialist unions often times associated with CTM. While CTM affiliates comprise 
mostly unions conciliatory with respect to the employer, independent unions threaten a 
more aggressive defense of workers’ rights. Fn NAO report concerning two garment 
maquiladoras illustrates the difficulties independent unions face: Matamoros Garment 
S.A. de C.V. and Tarrant México S.R. de C.V. Workers tried to unionize under the 
Center for Worker Support (Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador: CAT) in 2003. The board 
rejected both petitions for technicalities: The board rejected the former because 
petitioners had misspelled one of the names of the petitioners, for failure to state the 
reason for unionizing, failure to properly authorize the list, failure to authenticate that 
workers were over 14 years of age, one worker on the list denied having attached his 
signature, and the board’s inability to verify that the plant had a minimum of twenty 
workers (the plant having suspiciously closed the very day the board came to inspect for 
verification; in the case of the latter, for failure to submit two copies of the petition, 
failure to elect its executive committee, for the misspelling of one out of 728 workers’ 
names, failure to establish bylaws regarding union’s assets, and unclear bylaws 
concerning member discipline. Some of the causes for rejection do not fall under any of 
the reasons listed under registration requirements (LFT 356, 371). Further, the LFT 
stipulates that the board has the responsibility to invite the workers to correct their 
petition’s deficiencies (LFT 685). In any event, having reviewed the relevant documents, 
the NAO found the petitioners had satisfied all registration requirements. The union filed 
an amparo* with the District Court for Labor Matters, but subsequently found itself 
sunable to pursue its amparo when its workers withdrew their claim in exchange for 
severance payments. In sum, the boards obstruct the establishment of independent unions. 
 
* an amparo is somewhat akin to a judicial appeal alleging illegal government action. 
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Although a few of the grounds for rejection likely have some validity, lack of 
substantiation characterize others or reveal a gross distortion of the LFT.13 
NAO consultants “concluded that [labor boards] generally [….] are known to be 
fair, impartial and unbiased, especially regarding their role in matters dealing with the 
rights of individuals; in collective matters, however, their activity is deemed to be more 
controversial. [Indeed,] in Mexico generally, [they] are biased in favor of companies, 
especially in matters of collective bargaining” and by extension favor business’ officialist 
allies.14 
We conclude from the problematic behaviors' surface appearance that the boards 
wield significant discretion in certifying collective labor actions at labor's expense. 
Discretion has the advantage of endowing the implementing agency with flexibility to 
address the particulars of each case across time. The converse of such discretion is that 
the agency's policy implementation depends to a high degree on the attitude of the 
agency's personnel.  
b) Business Associations. 
 The business sector enjoys one of the best organizations in Latin America. Its 
concerted action attests to neoliberalism's pivotal role in Mexican politics and by 
extension helps explain the states’ lack of commitment to labor rights. Because business 
wields so much power it has in effect co-opted the state. These business organizations 
underpin the continuity characterizing neoliberalism embrace. Business articulate their 
neoliberal economic agenda through these organized media outlets.  
Four principal private business organizations share the reins of corporate power: 
COPARMEX, the Council of Mexican Businessmen (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de 
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Negocios: CMHN), the Business Coordinating Council (Consejo Coordinador 
Empresarial: CCE), and the Trade Coordinator for Business Entreprises (Coordinadora de 
Organismos Empresariales de Comercio Exterior: COECE). Although the Confederation 
of National Chambers of Commerce (Confederación de Cámaras Nacionales de 
Comercio: CONCANACO) had a promising beginning as the official business entity, 
COPARMEX, CMHN, CCE, and COECE have displaced the latter as the organ by which 
business interests dominate the state.  
 These organizations range from the exclusive CMHN, which consists of the forty 
largest corporations, to COPARMEX, which includes many small and medium sized 
businesses. Further, their influence reflects their exclusivity, with CMHN decisively 
carrying the most weight in government policy decisions. For instance, CMHN annually 
announces at Los Pinos (the Mexican equivalent of the White House) their investment 
commitments for the coming year, an exhortatory fanfare directed to promote the 
Mexican market. Such heft provides CMHN with unique political leverage. CMHN has 
monthly luncheons where members gather to discuss economic policy issues of the day 
with senior cabinet officials in a closed press environment. A highpoint in its political 
influence came in 1987 when the PRI President de la Madrid, asked CMHN to interview 
its top six presidential candidates before choosing his successor. Notwithstanding this last 
high profile seminal political event, CMHN prefers discretion. CMHN has made itself the 
funding backbone of the other more visible business organizations. The CCE has its own 
research and public relations corps. Reflecting its essential role in financing these other 
organizations, CMHN invariably holds their presidencies. CCE is the peak business 
confederation including both CMHN and COPARMEX. COECE is CCE’s auxiliary 
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committee concerned with trade agreements. It coordinated support for NAFTA among 
businessmen and helped design the agreement. COECE flanked the Mexican 
government’s NAFTA delegation, often hovering directly outside closed-door inter-
governmental meetings to advise Mexican political representatives. Business interests 
have a privileged rapport with government principals whom they persuade, cajole and 
pressure. Thanks to these business organizations, the state often appears business' 
handmaiden, which leads to a biased arbiter in the case of the labor boards as we shall 
see.15 
c) How Companies Undermine Unions. 
 Business interests also protect their interests at the level of the company, 
especially when it comes to minimizing independent unionization as much as possible.  
General Motors provides a telling example of corporations’ deliberate strategy in this 
regard. Its three main stratagems include heavily screening job applicants to remove 
potential union activists from their midst, operating a divide and conquer strategy mostly 
through a hierarchical pay schedule, and offering low-budget, but valuable amenities to 
workers provided by pseudo-unions. The first ploy amounts to scrutinizing job 
applicants’ “credentials.” Desired applicants typically have a ninth-grade education with 
family members to support and high monthly rent payments, qualities deemed amenable 
to long-term employment. Once applicants meet these requirements, they undergo a 
battery of physical and psychological tests to determine their ability to adapt to line work. 
This filtering process results weeds out 75% of applicants because they do not fit the 
searched for profile. By dividing the workforce through differential pay scales for same 
work GM obviates the potential for an esprit de corps forming between the various firms 
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in its integrated enterprise (including input suppliers and assembly plants). Such foresight 
stems from its fearing the debilitating consequences of production-wide work-stoppages. 
GM also essentially segregates workers per plant by gender to take advantage of general 
distrust across gender lines, reaching levels of 80% gender exclusivity.  GM also 
considers women more pliant as do many maquiladoras belying their they 
pronouncement to the contrary. The company finances union social workers to advise 
workers on how to handle workers’ new found moneys. These ersatz union 
administrators become in effect workers’ accountants upon which the workers in turn 
come to depend. GM thus has a multi-faceted and effective strategy to discourage 
independent unionization.16 Employers commonly have little hesitation in committing 
labor improprieties because they know well enough that workers in economic straits have 
little choice but to sign a severance agreement, thereby relinquishing their claims against 
the company, rather than pursue a lengthy arbitration to obtain justice. The employers’ 
arsenal comprises other weapons such as to falsely accuse employees of crimes, to have 
job applicants sign “blank sheets” as a condition for their employment, which employers 
can subsequently fill out as fits their needs and to compile “black lists” of recalcitrant 
workers all of which pressure fired workers to sign severance agreements.17 
Businesses also resort to ghost unions and outright intimidation and threats of 
violence. Ghost unions permit businesses to exclude independent unions thanks to a legal 
sleight of hand. They form roughly 90% of collective bargaining agreements and thereby 
help explain business’ ability to thwart the formation of independent unions (see infra). 
Business’ armamentarium to defeat independent unions also comprises direct 
intimidation and threats of physical violence.  When workers at a General Electric 
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Mexican subsidiary initiated a campaign to elect an independent union, the firm harassed 
them as they attempted to distribute campaign literature and fired some 20 activist 
workers for having met with a United Electrical Workers auxiliary delegation.18 
Widespread irregularities undermine union elections' authenticity. Han Young offered to 
pay $2 000 to an activist leader at its plant if he desisted from organizing and $125 to 
each worker who voted for the CTM union against the independent union. At the TAESA 
election (see supra) TAESA had hired “armed soldiers . . . with heavy caliber arms [on 
the premises including on the roof], attack dogs, an electrified wire” and concert speakers 
blaring the TAESA theme song. This combination of business' anti-union preventive and 
coercive tactics exemplifies some of the difficulties independent union organizers face. 
Given this overt hostility to independent union formation, it should come as no surprise 
that, thanks to their organizational heft, business influence on the boards in conjunction 
with the boards discretion, leads to boards that implement a labor policy agreeable to 
business interests and to labor's detriment. 
4. Who Benefits and Who Suffers under the Present Situation. 
The state-business alliance completely smothers independent union efforts. 
Without genuine union representation workers have very little bargaining power and their 
remuneration and working conditions suffer as a consequence. Business exploits the 
favored position it now enjoys vis-á-vis the state, by brazenly violating workers’ rights 
knowing full well that the state only half-heartedly enforces the LFT. As a result, 
business increases its profits at the expense of labor. This pro-business conjuncture 
applies especially to the EPZs where the state gives relative free rein to the maquiladoras 
to attract the foreign direct investment (FDI) Mexico needs to pay off its foreign debts. 
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Given that business has captured the state, these two win under present labor relations. 
The losers are independent unions and the unrepresented masses of Mexican workers.19 
5. Conclusion. 
The state is closely tied with business interests, especially in union formation. 
Business enjoys unrivaled access to the state thanks to its powerful business 
organizations promoting a labor flexibility agenda. At the plant level it adopts an 
aggressively anti-union approach to personnel management. Additionally, employers 
readily use more direct and forcible methods to disrupt independent unionization. In sum, 
the labor boards and business constitute a formidable front more or less united in 
thwarting independent union activity.  
Part III: Explanations of the Causes of the Behavior that 
Comprise the Difficulty. 
1. Introduction. 
 To explain the actors' behavior we now apply the ROCCIPI methodology. The 
acronym stands for Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process, 
Interest, and Ideology. ROCCIPI ensures a comprehensive analysis to best understand the 
causes of the behaviors constituting the difficulty, which our legislative proposal will 
ultimately have to address to ensure its effectiveness. After presenting the Mexican 
Constitution's fundamental role in defining workers' rights, we consider in turn, our two 
role occupants, i.e., the labor boards and business. To this effect, we apply the ROCCIPI 
analytical framework, with respect to each role occupant. We accord pride of place to the 
19
LFT rule most pertinent to the role occupant in question and then proceed with the rest of 
the ROCCIPI agenda. 
2. Explaining the Actor’s Behavior according to ROCCIPI. 
a) The Mexican Constitution and the LFT. 
The Mexican Constitution in Article 123, Title VI “Of Labor and Social Security” 
provides that business and workers have the right to organize themselves into 
associations representing their particular interests and that workers have the right to 
strike: Art 123: “XVI. Workers as well as business owners will have the right to come 
together with each other in defense of their respective interests; forming unions, 
professional associations, et cetera;” “XVII. The Constitution itself neglects to offer 
guidelines to curb discretion in implementing labor rights. As we shall see, this role of 
filling in the essential details devolves to the LFT. 
b) Labor Boards 
 The labor boards systematically impede union registration. 
i. LFT Rule: Union Registration. 
Theoretically one can easily establish a union. To form a union requires a 
minimum of 20 workers (LFT 364). To register, the union must file the following 
documentation: an authenticated copy of the minutes of the constituent assembly, a list of 
members with their name, residence, and place of work, an authenticated copy of the 
union’s bylaws, and an authenticated copy of the minutes for the election of the board of 
directors (LFT 365). The union’s secretary general, organizing secretary and minutes 
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secretary retain the right to authorize the above documents unless the union’s bylaws 
stipulate otherwise (LFT 365). The board can only refuse to register the union if the 
union does not aim to better workers’ interests; if the union does not have the required 20 
members; or if the union does not file the right documentation (LFT 356, 366). Once 60 
days have elapsed since filing the petition the workers can demand that the board 
announce its decision. After a further three days if the board still has yet to decide the 
board must automatically registered (LFT 366). If more than one union contends to 
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement with an employer, the union with the most 
votes gains the right to negotiate (LFT 388). Disputes over who has the most votes take 
place like any other labor dispute before the boards (LFT 892-895). Either party can also 
call for a recount (LFT 931). Employers must negotiate with the representative union or 
face a strike (LFT 387). Finally, the Panel on Representatives’ Responsibility (Jurado de 
Responsabilidades de los Representantes) comprised of the usual tripartite structure can 
sanction, including with a dismissal, those representatives who participate in proceedings 
in which they have a conflict of interest; who impose unjustified delays; or who vote for a 
resolution that is patently illegal or unjust (LFT 671-674, 707-708). The board’s 
Presiding Officer has the obligation to investigate and mete out appropriate sanctions to 
officials and staff other than the representatives (LFT 637). A tripartite committee of 
representatives constitutes the feedback mechanism, which has the responsibility to 
inform the Secretary of Labor of any deficiencies in the boards functioning (LFT 614). 
ii. OCCIPPI: Labor Boards 
 The rules reveal that the boards have decisive opportunities and capacity to thwart 
independent union efforts. They wield full discretion in ascertaining the outcomes of 
21
labor conflicts. These present themselves most notably when unions attempt to register 
with the boards. The boards' wide discretion ties into the fact that the rules effectively 
insulate them from oversight. Although in theory the tripartite representative committees 
and ultimately the Secretary of Labor aught to hold the board members accountable no 
evidence indicates that anyone ever actually holds them as such in any of the sources 
reviewed. In such a situation unaccountability prevails. The rules stipulate that the 
eligible members of the board have the responsibility to oversee, reprimand and 
otherwise punish LFT violations. In this respect, one should praise the rule requiring the 
dismissal of a member guilty of issuing a blatantly unjust ruling. Yet, because each of the 
tripartite bodies oversees itself, the members are accountable only to themselves and 
therefore to no one. To make matters worse, when the state intervenes to reprove its 
board member, it did not seek to uphold the LFT. Quite the contrary, for instance, it has 
pressured the state board member into resigning or simply fired them when these latter 
have seen fit to respect the law and approved independent union registration activity as in 
the Han Young case.20 
Communication of the law remains a critical problem. The boards do provide 
detailed written copies of the grounds on which they based their decision to each party 
thereby allowing the parties to contest the decision with an amparo. However, while the 
boards require registration of collective bargaining agreements and the unions that 
negotiated them, there is no public registry where workers can verify whether a union, 
which may be claiming to represent them, already exists. In practically all the cases 
mentioned above, workers did not know that a union already existed until they discovered 
it through their efforts at unionization. Yet, complaints require the name of the parties so 
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that the board can give notice to the opposing party (LFT 751). What should be a mere 
formality becomes an insuperable obstacle because the boards do not provide a public 
registry where workers can ascertain the name of the opposing party.  
 In terms of process, the boards lack accountability in that decisions that 
egregiously contravene the law and standards of justice do not bring about the reprove or 
destitution of the responsible authorities. In practice , the boards habitually violate their 
own stipulated deadlines and, yet, the boards have not shown themselves willing to hold 
their own accountable for such violations. Finally, feedback is the responsibility of a 
committee comprised of the tripartite representatives, which poses additional glaring 
conflict of interest problems. 
 The board, as part of the state apparatus, favors business interests both because 
businessmen occupy the highest echelons of power and because of a general business 
persuasion at all levels of government as the top-tier inexorably diffuses its predilections 
to its subordinates. Furthermore, even were the state is not so closely tied to business 
interests a vibrant economy is the sine qua non of a successful political term. Neoliberal 
economic ideology, besides dovetailing with business interests, admonishes that to attract 
domestic and foreign investment requires labor peace and flexibility. In this light, the 
boards become the state’s critical instruments to encourage such a receptive investment 




i. LFT Rule: Labor Standards. 
Mexican labor laws embody some of the most progressive labor rights in the 
world when written and remain so today. The Constitution spells out in Article 123 Title 
VI “Of Labor and Social Considerations” workers’ rights to satisfactory remuneration 
and working conditions, including: a maximum of eight-hour work days, six days a week, 
a minimum wage, overtime pay, severance pay, profit sharing, occupational safety and 
health standards and protection from dismissal without just cause. Businesses must 
adhere to the minimum labor standards set out in the Constitution and detailed in the 
LFT, as well as, stipulations of any collective bargaining agreements or other contracts 
they enter into (LFT 919). Furthermore, they cannot negotiate a reduction in labor 
conditions from those in force (LFT 394). They must negotiate with the representative 
unions at their instigation (LFT 387). Though offering to protect labor rights the rules 
allow for too much discretion and omit sanctions for violations. 
ii. OCCIPPI: Business 
Although in its broad outlines the law offers some protection to labor rights, it 
still provides large loopholes or opportunities of which unprincipled employers take 
advantage. Given the employers’ obligation to negotiate with the standing union, they 
have every incentive to engage the services of a compliant union before employees form 
a more assertive union. By employers preempting a truly representative union unionizers 
face the tremendous difficulty of dislodging the incumbent union (see supra). "Protection 
contracts" aptly refer to these contracts negotiated between employers and pliant unions, 
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which represent some 90% of collective bargaining agreements. These unions often exist 
only on paper, an existence, which workers only discover to their dismay upon filing to 
establish their own union (hence the term ghost union). CTM offers such conciliatory 
unions. In exchange for legitimizing the employer sponsored workers union, CTM 
receives payment from the said employer and, in tandem, deepen their ranks and thus 
strengthen their overall sway in the neoliberal system.21 As the purveyor of funds and the 
linchpin of economic growth, business persuades, cajoles and coerces state officials and 
corrupt union leaders. 
Regarding communication of the law, businesses know precisely the law and the 
loopholes that it affords. As for process, we have seen supra their role on labor boards, as 
well as, their disreputable, even criminal activities aimed at forcibly preventing the 
formation of independent unions. While the state inspects businesses for labor violations, 
unfortunately it has neither the commitment nor the resources to implement an effective 
inspection scheme as the NAO reports: “Notwithstanding repeat inspections, however, 
serious unabated violations were allowed to continue over this entire period [1993-
1997].”22 
Business has primordial loyalty to their bottom line. To ensure the largest profits 
possible business does everything it can to repress wages. To stay competitive, they seek 
the greatest possible flexibility including notably control over production and therefore 
workers. On both these issues business oppose truly representative labor unions and, as a 
result, seeks to discourage them. Business does not have an incentive to idly sit back till 
independent unions form and then negotiate with them because the ensuing labor strikes 
disturb the labor peace upon which business relies. They go so far as to relocate, rather 
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than deal with an assertive union. Since relocation is expensive, however, they often 
times choose tactics in the penumbra between the legal and the criminal, which 
undermine independent union formation. Businesses' neoliberal economic policy, which 
their business organizations push, encompass the tenets of labor flexibility at the service 
of business interests.  
3. Conclusion. 
 In sum, the LFT ambitiously attempts to protect workers, but, unfortunately 
leaves gross loopholes, of which opportunistic state officials and businessmen readily 
take advantage to the detriment of workers’ rights. Because collective labor conflicts 
have the potential to threaten Mexico's neoliberal agenda, the labor boards refuse to 
adequately implement the LFT to enforce collective labor rights. Although, in most 
respects, they do not violate the LFT's explicit provisions, they eviscerate its spirit, i.e., to 
defend workers' rights. They depart from the LFT's spirit, if not its letter, by legitimizing 
protection contracts and ghost unions, obstructing independent unions' registration, 
arbitrarily prohibiting strikes, their absence in overseeing union elections, their 
underwriting exclusion clauses and, in general, wielding unchecked discretion to 
prejudice independent unions. Any valid proposal for solution will have to address these 
issues. This analysis lays a basis in facts, logically organized, for designing detailed 
provisions in our bill to alter or eliminate the problematic behaviors' causes, and induce 
role occupants to behave in ways likely to ensure more effective protection of workers' 
efforts to organize independent unions, which can represent and protect them in their in-
plant conflict with management. 
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Part IV: Proposal for Solution.
1. Introduction. 
Having examined the problem and its causes we now turn to proposed solutions. 
In line with legislative theory, our proposed bill's detailed provisions logically aim to 
alter or eliminate the objective and subjective causes of the relevant role occupants' 
behaviors that, in the past, contributed to thwarting workers' efforts to build independent 
trade unions. We present the two main alternative proposals for improving labor 
conditions: reforming labor standards' regulatory framework of and the government's 
plan to revise the labor boards. The former proposes to address labor conditions by 
focusing on means other than strengthening independent labor unions. By presenting this 
option, we ensure that we do not forego promising alternative proposals by limiting 
ourselves to independent labor unions.  
Next, we articulate our bill’s major provisions' details. We then demonstrate the 
advantages our bill has over its rivals by explaining how each provision addresses the 
specific causes underlying the problematic behaviors opposing independent labor unions. 
We also assess the costs and benefits of the bill and indicate monitoring mechanisms to 
ensure feedback on the bill’s performance. One cannot overemphasize the importance of 
these latter monitoring mechanisms because they both ensure feedback on the bill's 
effectiveness whether fault resides in its construction or in the agency's implementation. 
In this head, we consider the very real possibility that independent unions will ineluctably 
become like their predecessors, neoliberal instruments rather than genuinely representing 
the workers. We then conclude.  
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2. Alternative Proposals for Solutions. 
There are three means the state can institute to improve and protect workers’ 
conditions: Regulatory labor standards, labor relations reform and direct state social 
provisions (social security etc.).23 Considering in passing the latter option first, social 
provisions require funds. Unfortunately, budget strictures combined with austerity 
measures, which international financial institutions have pressed upon Mexico appear to 
bar an expansion of the welfare state.   
Reforming the regulatory framework of labor standards has its attractiveness in its 
ostensible simpliciy. Government promulgates the appropriate standards and an agency 
(in the case of Mexico, the Secretary of Labor) implements them. However, such a policy 
has its complications. Mexico has one of the most regulated labor markets in the world 
including stipulations as to minimum wage, dismissals restricted to just cause, and 
detailed health and safety standards. The weak link, as it were, the Secretary of Labor, 
does not and/or cannot perform its job adequately. The sheer vastness of the undertaking, 
that is to say, inspecting the 100,000s of firms, signs the inspections' demise from the 
beginning. Assuming a Secretary sincere in its mission, it would still face an 
insurmountable challenge: Keeping the entire labor market in line with its labor 
standards. Given the limited funding available, it does not seem reasonable to expect the 
Secretary to successfully see its mission through. Furthermore, the government does not 
have the conviction to root out violators. The government has a conflict of interest 
because of its close ties to business. Whether under the present incumbent, the PAN, or 
under the alternative PRI leadership, those with power remain in government; and the 
business interests have the money and influence to arrogate to themselves this power. 
28
Thus when one says government, we should assume that state and business interests 
coincide. Basically, only the very credulous would feel comfortable relying upon the 
government to see through with minimum funding the formidable inspection scheme 
necessary to effectively enforce labor standards throughout Mexico’s labor market.  
Neither is the PAN proposal to reform labor relations and the labor boards a 
credible remedy to unsatisfactory labor conditions. Its ostensible goal is labor market 
flexibilization steeped in neocorporatism. The proposal, called the Abascal Project, 
named after the former head of COPARMEX, now the head of the Secretary of Labor 
under the PAN, is a blueprint for reinforcing neoliberal and anti-union policies, i.e., labor 
market flexibilization. In addition to eviscerating labor protections, such as restrictions on 
firing, it assaults protections on the right of workers to freely associate in independent 
unions. It adds to the number of documents unions need, before the Secretary of Labor 
will certify them as unions, documents that the Secretary of Labor has, but will not share 
with the prospective unions. It limits the number of union applications to one at a time. 
Given that it can take a year or more for the process to run its course, this requirement 
serves to retard the formation of unions and therefore undermines their pertinence to 
resolve problems in the here and now. The Abascal Project goes so far as to require that 
workers favoring a union election identify themselves as such. This invites retaliation on 
the part of the firm and their government allies. True, the proposal institutes secret ballots 
in union elections; however, the previous identification requirement vitiates the purported 
benefits of a secret ballot. For all Abascal Project’s objectionable clauses, its deficiencies 
lie also in what it does not do. Absent is a requirement that the Secretary of Labor 
provide a public registry for unions and collective bargaining agreements. Consequently, 
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the authorities refuse workers the requisite information to form unions. The above 
provisions reforming the labor boards, by their inclusion, as well as, their omission, 
would serve to undermine existing labor protections and to entrench the unrepresentative 
unions.24 
3. Description of the Details of the Bill’s Major Provisions. 
a) List of bill's major provisions. 
The labor boards must… 
• require a union election even for the initial union registration. 
• provide for a public registry of union registrations. 
• be obligated to certify a union election within two weeks of a union petition. 
• secure a secret ballot for union elections. 
Note: Fully protecting labor rights will require additional legislation, in particular, 
legislation directly addressing business labor violations. 
c) The bill's reforms. 
We propose a bill, which revises the labor boards to strengthen independent labor 
unions and thereby help to improve labor conditions. While the labor boards make 
excessive, even insurmountable demands on challenging unions, they perfunctorily 
accept a firm’s initial union. The present situation lends itself too readily to the 
establishment of the discredited ghost unions and associated protection contracts. 
Legislation should require a union election to legitimize this initial union organization. 
Furthermore, the labor boards must provide a public registry of all union registrations, 
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collective bargaining agreements and any other documentation required of union 
petitions. They have the relevant information and can readily make it available to the 
public. The law should oblige the labor boards to certify the holding of union elections 
within two weeks of receiving the relevant petition. Also, democratic elections free of 
intimidation demands a secret ballot and the labor boards should institute this measure. 
4. How the Bill Addresses the Causes of the Difficulty. 
The proposal eliminates those provisions that underpin unrepresentative unions. 
The stricter review of initial union organization, where previously review was 
nonexistent, aims to condemn protection contracts. These protection contracts presently 
underpin the structure obstructing the formation of independent unions. The public 
registry would by its very nature eliminate ghost unions. Workers could then verify who 
supposedly represents them. Just as importantly, the public registry as a repository of all 
documentation necessary to a successful petition would enable workers to avail 
themselves of their right to hold union elections to replace existing unresponsive ghost 
unions. The two week deadline on processing the union election request should give the 
labor boards sufficient time to process the paperwork. Such a timetable would encourage 
discontented workers to hold elections because their demands for representation would 
bear fruit in the immediate future. The secret ballot prevents employers and ghost unions 
from retaliating against particular workers since they would no longer know who was 
behind the union election initiative nor who ultimately voted in favor of the newly 
formed representative union.  
5. Costs and Benefits of the Bill. 
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The proposal’s reforms should impose minimal economic costs in terms of its 
implementation. The labor boards would not have responsibility for any additional 
oversight or implementation except as it pertains to reviewing the initial union 
organizations. All in all, the labor boards’ structure would remain the same and would not 
entail additional responsibilities and therefore resources.  
Business interests’ bottom line may suffer due to their diminished ability to 
exploit their workers. Business’ government allies would also find fewer opportunities on 
the labor boards to intervene on the side of business. Since, the bill aims to redistribute 
power from business to independent unions and by extension workers , we should view 
the costs the state and business incur not as costs, but as the necessary consequence of 
revitalizing workers’ rights.  
6. Monitoring Performance. 
The bill leaves very little discretion to the labor boards in terms of supporting the 
implementation of the bill’s provisions after its promulgation. It mainly specifies what 
the boards cannot do in terms of interfering with their formation. Where the bill directs 
the boards to do something, as in the case of the public registry, nongovernmental 
organizations should serve to monitor that the boards actually implement the bill's 
relatively straightforward provisions.The independent unions embody the bill’s 
monitoring linchpin. Once in place, they will serve as the boards' principal monitor. 
Independent of the state and business they will have as their sole purpose and interest will 
the defense of workers’ rights.  
By removing the obstacles to independent unions, we expect them to flourish. The 
bill's provisions, in particular, those which removes the prohibitory red tape and requires 
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secret ballots promises workers the freedom to unionize. To realize their empowerment, 
nongovernmental organizations such as independent unions and human rights 
organizations, both domestic and international will have to participate in training workers 
to take advantage of their newfound right to organize. Fortunately, organizations 
promises to fill this need. International unions such as the United Electrical Radio & 
Machine Workers of America International, Human Rights Watch, and FAT have 
stepped into the brink to assist in empowering workers. Indeed, we can expect to see 
these nongovernmental organizations monitoring Mexican labor conditions, as well as, 
training union organizers given that their activism and research already underwrite this 
legislative research report. Those unions that ignore workers' demands will find 
themselves losing their incumbency. Ultimately, however, our bill having empowered 
workers to freely unionize, relies on workers' commitment to improving their lot. 
Therefore, the combination of explicit prohibitions, limited discretion and 
accountability, assistance on the part of nongovernmental organizations and the 
development of independent unions themselves should enable adequate monitoring of the 
bill's implementation and thereby secure independent and representative labor unions to 
improve labor conditions in Mexico.  
7. Conclusion. 
Thus, neither additional social provisions, improved labor standards nor the 
present government’s proposal of reinforcing anti-union neoliberal policies viably 
promise to improve labor conditions. Our proposal focuses on eliminating the obstacles 
to the formation of independent unions. Its advantages consist in that it addresses the 
various means that explain businesses' and governmental allies' problematic behavior 
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while retaining the general structure of the relevant implementing agency. Its cost and 
benefits tend to reflect the undermining of the neoliberal state-business alliance and as 
such inevitably hurt business and their government supporters. However, workers’ 
conditions will significantly improve with a dedicated advocate on its behalf, i.e., 
independent unions. Finally, the bill incorporates monitoring considerations at various 
levels to restrict board members discretion and increase their accountability, including, 
first and foremost, through the separation of powers associated with the introduction of 
independent unions as a viable power favoring workers’ rights and a continued reliance 
on nongovernmental organizations to monitor progress. 
Part V: Conclusion. 
Mexican labor legislation is remarkable in the protection it promises workers. 
However, these provisions have mainly remained paper tigers. Especially in the last 
decade, working conditions have declined, in part, because of the increasing race to the 
bottom entailed by globalization and the spread of neoliberal economics. However, in 
recent times, under pressures for flexibilization, unions have seen their influence decline. 
As a result, workers have been left to fend for themselves. Legislation governing the right 
of association and union activity have up till now successfully prevented the formation of 
alternative, genuinely democratic unions to vindicate their rights. Labor standards in 
themselves and the government’s proposal of reinforcing anti-union neoliberal policies 
have limited promise. However, our bill proposes to remove the obstacles to the 
development of independent unions and invigorate workers’ rights. It would redistribute 
power to workers through the instrument of independent unions in large measure thanks 
to imparting these independent unions and other nongovernemntal organizations with the 
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role of monitoring working conditions. Through the promotion of independent unions the 
bill should go far in improving labor conditions in Mexico.  
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GLOSSARY:
ASSA: Association of Flight Attendants of Mexico/Asociación de Sindical de 
Sobrecargos de Aviación de México 
CAT: Center for Worker Support/Centro de Apoyo al Trabajador 
CCE: Business Coordinating Council/Consejo Coordinador Empresarial 
CEN: National Executive Committee/Comité Ejecutivo Nacional 
CMHN: Council of Mexican Businessmen/Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios 
COECE: Trade Coordinator for Business Entreprises/Coordinadora de Organismos 
Empresariales de Comercio Exterior  
CONCANACO: Confederation of National Chambers of Commerce/Confederación de 
Cámaras Nacionales de Comercio 
COPARMEX: Mexican Employers’ Confederation/Confederación Patronal de la 
República Mexicana 
CT: Labor Congress/Congreso del Trabajo 
CTM: Confederation of Mexican Workers/Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos 
EPZ: Export Processing Zone 
FAT: Authentic Labor Front/Frente Auténtico del Trabajo 
FDI: Foreign direct investment 
GM: General Motors 
ISI: Import Substitution Industrialization 
LFT: Federal Labor Law/Ley Federal del Trabajo 
NAALC: North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAO: National Administrative Office 
NGO: Non governmental organization 
PAN: National Action Party/Partido de Acción Nacional 
PRD: Party of the Democratic Revolution/Partido de la Revolución Demócrata 
PRI: Institutional Revolutionary Party/Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
ROCCIPI: Rule, Opportunity/Capacity, Communication of Law, Process, Interests, and 
Ideology 
SNTETA: National Union of Air Transport Workers/Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores 
y Empleados del Transporte Aéreo 
SUTERM: Union of Electrical Workers/Sindicato Único de Trabajadores Electricistas de 
la República Mexicano 
TAESA: Executive Air Transport/Transporte Aereos Ejecutivos 
UNT: National Workers Union/Unión Nacional de Trabajadores 
SNTE: National Union of Workers in Education/Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de 
la Educación 
SUTERM: Exclusive Union of Mexican Electrical Workers/Sindicato Único de 
Trabajadores Electricistas de la República Mexicana 
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